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The COVID-19 pandemic in 2019/2020 ushered in a new turbulent and chaotic global environment where 
governments not only placed temporary restrictions on people’s movements, but also mandated limits on 
business activities. However, lacking in the contemporary scholarly discourse is a deeper understanding 
of how businesses respond to such pandemics. In this research note (RN), a conceptual framework of 
firms’ responses is advanced. Using the global airline industry, the analysis delineates a host of internally 
generated and externally imposed firms’ strategic and tactical responses to the pandemic including in-
flight service changes, flight cancellations, seeking emergency aids and financial supports, and firm 
closures. The analysis demonstrates that in responding to the crisis, many airlines sought to minimise 
erosion of long-developed knowledge, market capabilities, route networks, access to airports, customer 
base and relationships/trust with customers prior to COVID-19 to equip them for recovery. The wider 
implications for academics, managers and governments are outlined as the effects of COVID-19 continue 
to unfold.  
Keywords: airlines; COVID-19; institutions; strategies; business environment. 
1 Introduction  
The epic transmission of COVID-19 across multiple countries with such a precipitous negative shock on 
national economies and accompanying social distancing measures to halt human-to-human transmissions 
makes it one of the most unparalleled events in modern times (see World Health Organization (WHO), 
2020a, 2020b). Nowadays, the popular press is replete with COVID-19 pandemic stories which continue 
to unfold across the globe affecting over 170 nations and territories (Lipsitch, Swerdlow & Finelli, 2020; 
The Economist, 2020a; 2020c; WHO, 2020; Worldometers, 2020; see also ; Craighead, Ketchen Jr, & 
Darby, 2020; Govindan, Mina, & Alavi, 2020; Cai & Choi, 2020). In many service-oriented economies 
and industries such as air travel and tourism, the COVID-19 pandemic and accompanying social 
distancing measures have virtually hampered business activities. In the midst of this epical changing 
global business environment, we are also often confronted with a myriad of unknowns and difficult 
challenges which force regulators, governments and businesses to respond. A plethora of research efforts 
has been directed at investigating pandemics (see also Lipsitch et al., 2020; Choi, 2020; Loske, 2020; Yu, 
Sun, Solvang & Zhao, 2020) and much of the prior academic literature on pandemics has tended to focus 
on the mortality rates, government policies and transmission mechanisms (see Nigmatulina & Larson, 
2009). Thus, a notable and significant shortcoming in the existing research is the very limited insights on 
businesses’ response to health crisis/pandemics. As demonstrated by past studies, “how companies 
respond to unforeseen disruptions such as pandemics or outbreaks remains limited” (Amankwah‐Amoah, 
2016a, p. 385). Recent research suggests that this necessitates a deeper understanding as to how businesses 
respond to the pandemic (Wenzel, Stanske & Lieberman, 2020).  
Against this backdrop, the objective of this research note (RN) is to examine how airlines’ have 
responded to COVID-19 and factors that facilitate, shape or constrain their responses. The airline industry 
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is one of the most global industries (Doganis, 2006), heavily impacted by governments’ restrictions on 
people movement (detailed analysis will follow shortly) and as such represents a fertile ground for 
exploring how firms respond to crisis. This study is also motivated by the growing importance and 
somehow increasing frequency of global health pandemics and the need for a better understanding of how 
governments, companies and international organisations not only attempt to anticipate these challenges 
but also respond to their occurrences. More than 29 million COVID-19 cases and 900,000 fatalities have 
been reported globally, demonstrating the importance of this issue (WHO, 2020b; Worldometers, 2020).  
The analysis makes pivotal contributions to the literature. First, in light of the evolving and 
unprecedented nature of COVID-19 and its impact on businesses and way of life (Lipsitch et al., 2020; 
WHO, 2020), this study contributes to the ongoing discourse by providing preliminary analysis of a host 
of airlines’ responses to the crisis, shedding light on factors that facilitate, shape or constrain their 
responses to the crisis. In addition, although some studies have explored the issue of pandemics (see 
Ivanov, 2020), these have often been done in isolation from businesses’ action and responses to such 
events. In this direction, an integrated framework of analysis was developed and utilised to analyse firms’ 
responses to crisis, encapsulating the nature and timing of a host of strategic and tactical responses to the 
COVID-19 pandemic. Our analysis rectifies the oversight and offers insights into the short- and long-term 
responses adopted by airlines. Furthermore, although there are studies on firms’ responses to crisis 
(Mishra, 1996) and the timing of responses (see Wenzel et al., 2020), these two streams of scholarly works 
have emerged and developed insolation. The paper extends the literature by integrating these two largely 
divergent approaches to contribute to the ongoing conversation of the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic 
on global businesses by focusing the global airline industry. 
The sections that follow present a review of literature on firms’ responses to environmental 
jolts. After using the review to develop an organising framework, we then present the main findings using 
the integrated framework, followed by discussion of the implications. 
2 Firms’ Responses to Environmental Jolts: An Organising Framework 
Environmental jolts can be defined as “transient perturbations whose occurrences are difficult to foresee 
and whose impacts on organisations are disruptive and potentially inimical” (Meyer, 1982, p. 515). During 
crisis, some firms may seek to preserve their key employees, market knowledge and resources, whilst 
concurrently striving to minimise the adverse effects of sudden changes in the business conditions 
(Amankwah‐Amoah, 2016a; Wenzel et al., 2020). A good example in the global airline industry is that 
following the COVID-19-induced crisis, British Airways (BA) decided to bring forward its decision to 
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discontinue Boeing 747 fleets as part of its recovery strategy. The airliner once dubbed the “Queen of the 
Skies”, the “most recognisable” among the public as well as the preferred choice of global airlines for 
long-haul routes (Flight International, 2020; Specia, 2020). By joining other global airlines such as Qantas 
that have phased out or in the process of phasing out their 747s fleets (Specia, 2020), BA was able to usher 
in a new recovery approach to counteract the COVID-19 effects. According to the Flight International 
(2020, p. nd), the withdrawal of the 747’s from service crucially eliminated a fleet that “represents higher 
operating costs from both fuel-burn and maintenance perspectives”. This shift also epitomizes a new era 
where airlines are increasingly embracing new generation fuel efficient aircrafts (Flight International, 
2020; Specia, 2020). 
To explore the issue of firms’ responses to jolts, we situate our analysis within the literature on timing and 
locus of causality of organisational actions/inactions/failure. Time is a pivotal dimension in firms’ 
responses to jolts/events and its effects may be difficult to determine. Past studies have demonstrated that 
timing is a key resource which can grant an organisation a first- or late-mover advantage in the face of 
crisis (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988, 1998; Makadok, 1998) and can also be harnessed in devising 
suitable responses by firms to environment-altering events (Grzymala-Busse, 2011). Linked to timing is 
availability of information, resources and cost, which could determine whether the organisation, actors or 
decision-makers act in a proactive or reactive manner (Grzymala-Busse, 2011). Thus, there is a shorter-
term and longer-term dimension to firms’ responses shaped by the duration or nature of the event (Aguinis 
& Bakker, 2020).  
The duration of events can determine the nature of its effect on firms’ activities as well as the 
availability or diversity of resources and expertise that firms can mobilise and deploy to contain/respond 
to crisis. Grzymala-Busse (2011, p. 1289) observed that, “where negative externalities exist, early movers 
are advantaged” due to pioneering costs of responding to the event. Late arrivals in responding to negative 
external events have the opportunity to observe and learn from other firms and therefore are more likely 
to be effective in devising their responses (see Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988; Makadok, 1998). Over 
time, some firms may opt to scale back their operations (retrenchment) to reduce costs, and develop 
networks and markets in response to an unfolding crisis (Bruton, Ahlstrom & Wan, 2003). This approach, 
in tandem with curtailing the business scope (De Figueiredo, Feldman and Rawley 2019), is likely to span 
over both a short-term and long-term strategy (see Bluedorn & Ferris 2004; Bluedorn & Martin 2008). 
Broadly speaking, short-term responses may focus on meeting immediate environmental demands and 
ensuring immediate survival of the business, whereas, long-term responses are designed to focus on future 
periods and entailed enduring set of actions, which can be a number of years (see Bluedorn & Ferris 2004; 
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Bluedorn & Martin 2008). At the effects of crisis unfold, some firms that display ineffectiveness or failure 
to respond may be forced to exit the industry (Amankwah-Amoah, 2016b). For new firms, survival is 
often paramount which often precipitate short-term oriented strategy. 
Underpinning literature pertaining to the locus of causality is useful in understanding the issue. 
Here, there are two main schools of thought: voluntaristic and deterministic views (Amankwah-Amoah, 
2016b; Amankwah-Amoah et al., 2020; Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2004; Whetten, 1987; Zhang et al., 2019). 
The deterministic perspective views organisational actions as being driven by external factors such as 
government directions, economic recession, declining demand and luck, over which managers have 
limited or no control (Amankwah-Amoah, 2016b). Often government-mandated actions can drive small 
and financially weak firms into bankruptcy. Given that legitimacy is conferred by organisational 
stakeholders, they can also force a firm to act or adopt a set of measures to maintain its existence (Perrow, 
1970). Thus, government pressures can force firms to adopt a course of action irrespective of the impact 
on the firms’ operations.  
Businesses are viewed as victims of crisis or unpredictable circumstances in their business 
environment e.g. natural disasters such as flash flooding, tornadoes, landslides, earthquakes, sinkholes, 
volcanic eruptions, heat waves and droughts. These events can suddenly alter the business environment, 
culminating in closure, redesign of the business model or firms actually closing down. Many firms are 
often unable to fully capitalise on their existing resources and expertise to identify and neutralise 
environmental threats, which often forces closure of the business (Delmas & Toffel, 2008). In contrast to 
the other perspective, the voluntaristic perspective traces actions, inaction and firm failure to managers, 
workers and characteristics of the organisation such as resource and expertise (Amankwah-Amoah et al., 
2018; Mellahi, & Wilkinson, 2004). Extending previous research, we contend that firms’ ability to 
respond to a global outbreak is predicated on its firm-specific assets which denotes resources and expertise 
of the firms including relationships nurtured over time. From this literature, we contend two types of firm 
responses: internally designed/generated and externally imposed.  
In keeping with insights from the timing literature, we contend two dimensions of timing: short-
term and long-term. Thus, businesses respond to crisis either in the short term or long term via utilisations 
of their own expertise and resources or requirements/set of actions imposed on an industry by external 
entities/parties, as shown in Figure 1. Externally imposed responses are driven by external/institutional 
factors such as governments, industry bodies and societies to ensure standardisation of responses and 
securing wider participation of all firms in the industry for the proposed course of action. It stems from 
actions of external actors of the organisation or simply an outcome of regulatory, political, social and 
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economic changes. However, externally imposed courses of action tend to be detached from organisation-
specific problems and shortcomings which can amplify organisational problems. With internally 
generated responses to crisis, the organisation has direct ownership and influence in devising and carrying 
out the course of action with the aim of ensuring its long-term survival. They are carefully designed 
organisational approaches and sets of actions informed by the organisation’s knowledge, experiences and 
market knowledge. Anchored in the internally generated course of action is deployment of firm-specific 
key resources and expertise to respond to or neutralise the external threats (McCutchen Jr, 1993).  
Figure 1: A Unified Organising Framework of Firm Responses 
 
 
When crises/jolts emerge, they often release the constraints on organisational-decision makers and 
their latitude to act, thereby opening up a wider range of strategic options, ammunitions and actions for 
firms (Bryson, 1981; Wenzel et al., 2020) including different engagements with governments, customers, 
clients and suppliers. Firms are likely to face imposed responses as well as sets of actions during crisis. It 
is, therefore, expected that firms may be motivated to embrace internally initiated as well as externally 
imposed responses to develop new relationships with political actors to secure access to financial and 
political resources in both the short term and long term to ensure survival of their businesses. The above 
7 
dialogue suggests that during crisis, different firms in an industry would likely exhibit some of these 
different responses.  
Crossing the pillars produces the 2 × 2 matrix of firm responses to external environmental shock. 
As demonstrated in Figure 1, internally generated short-term responses (Quadrant I) describes the short-
term operational and tactical responses to the unfolding organisational crisis. This is where early-warning 
signals or cues necessitate modifications in the processes, routines, strategy and structures of the 
organisation. Externally imposed short-term responses (Quadrant II) is where early-warning signals or 
cues of crisis lead to an external actor-imposed course of action to curtail the negative effects. The 
internally generated long-term responses (Quadrant III) is where the crisis demands long-term strategic 
and operational responses within the firms to prepare for the post-crisis environment. The externally 
imposed long-term responses (Quadrant IV) focuses on long-term political network development and 
leveraged overtime to enhance the competitiveness of the firms. 
3 Airlines’ Responses to COVID-19 
Online Supplementary Appendix 1 provides a more general overview of the global airline industry and 
COVID-19 as the research setting. Following and applying Figure 1, we delineate the responses adopted 
by airlines around the globe, and the internal and external factors that facilitated or impinged on responses. 
Online Supplementary Appendix 2 provides additional details on the dimensions of the quadrants with 
illustrative examples.  
 Quadrant I: Internally generated short-term responses 
Quadrant I displays a situation where firms deduced internal responses to crisis with a largely short-term 
focus. In the preliminary stage, most airlines sought to make modest changes, focusing on environmental 
scanning associated with the virus and governments’ directives on travel to the affected area and WHO 
directives. In January 2020, Turkish Airlines was amongst others who conveyed their decision to assess 
the situation (Dunn, 2020c). Some of the early efforts by airlines focused on providing additional safety 
measures and suspending some services to minimise the risk of transmission. Given that the coronavirus 
transmits via human-to-human contact and microscopic droplets through coughing and sneezing, it makes 
it difficult to deliver people-to-people services (Hester, 2020). Several tactical responses were adopted 
during this phase including deep cleaning planes before take-off. For many airlines, cleaning staff were 
required to put on protective suits in helping to disinfect aircraft against the coronavirus (Cornwell, 2020). 
Such initiatives were further backed by airlines such as Cathay Pacific who reassured their customers of 
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measures being taken by highlighting the “intensifying disinfection of aircraft after landing, making cabin 
crews don gloves and masks, removing blankets, magazines and pillows, and adding safeguards to the in-
flight food and drink service” (Lee, 2020 p. nd).  
As the crisis unfolded, many airlines started moving towards introducing some elements of in-flight social 
distancing, compulsory temperature checks and demanding that passengers put on masks (Lee, 2020). 
Generally, the social distancing measures adopted by airlines sought to curtail social interaction between 
employees, employees and customers as well as between customers, with the aim of halting the elevation 
of potential risk to people. Without effective social distancing measures to stem or curtail coughing and 
sneezing in close proximity of others (Chaudhary & Maidment, 2020), airlines can potentially expose 
employees (in-flight crew) to the health risks stemming from the coronavirus outbreak. This was 
particularly relevant to the industry as the threat of virus transmission to the airlines’ in-flight crew might 
force them to opt for self-preservation over customer/passenger care, thereby compromising their duty of 
care. Some airports also adopted similar measures to reduce interaction between people and restrict large 
gatherings at their premises to curtail the spread of the virus.  
Figure 2: A Network Model of Effects of Social Distancing on Airline Business Model 
 
Nevertheless, the social distancing approach recommended by many governments was “nearly impossible 
to accomplish on an airplane” (Hester, 2020, p. nd). In-flight attendants work in tight spaces (often within 
6 feet of their and customers, i.e. the distancing recommended by US Centers for Disease Control and 
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Prevention), and make regular contact with passengers, pushing beverage carts up narrow aisles, reaching 
over customers to serve food and beverages and standing at arm’s length from customers to perform 
mandatory safety demonstrations (Hester, 2020, p. nd). In addition, flight attendants generally do not 
possess the expertise of medical doctors and healthcare professionals, and are therefore incapable of 
dealing with in-flight medical emergencies associated with someone with coronavirus (Hester, 2020). The 
effects of social distancing on the global airline business model are reflected in Figure 2. Online 
Supplementary Appendix 3 provides examples of multiple airlines that adopted this approach during the 
crisis period. 
 Quadrant II: Externally imposed short-term responses 
Quadrant II demonstrates a situation where a set of actions are imposed on the industry. Owing to the 
outbreak, a new directive was issued from WHO for the aviation industry and aviation personnel focused 
on the operational considerations to help halt the transmission of COVID-19. The proposed measures for 
in-flight and all personnel re-emphasised hand hygiene, social distancing, respiratory etiquette and 
seeking medical advice on suspected cases (WHO, 2020c). In line with WHO’s Guide to Hygiene and 
Sanitation in Aviation, some of the operational responses emphasised enhanced cleaning and disinfection 
which covers airports and service providers (WHO, 2020c). In addition, it re-emphasised post-event 
cleaning procedures and disinfecting contaminated surfaces following notification of suspected cases 
(WHO, 2020c). In relation to prior analysis, the observation about in-flight social distancing was further 
buttressed when India’s Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) suggested that airlines adopt in-
flight social distancing by keeping at least one metre between passengers at airport check-ins and security 
counters as well as keeping the middle seats empty on flights empty to minimise contact between 
passengers (Indiatoday, 2020). For instance, in an attempt to avert second outbreaks in China, the 
government limited inter-China flights for both Chinese and foreign airlines by allowing just one flight a 
week and each flight was not to exceed 75% capacity (BBC, 2020d). The effects of the crisis are further 
demonstrated when in Europe, for instance, largely due to government-imposed measures, all but a few 
“essential routes” on domestic and neighbouring markets remain functional, largely to allow critical travel, 
cargo, medical supplies and repatriation of nationals (Dunn, 2020d). In March 2020, following the 
Australian government’s guidelines and suggestions, Qantas and Jetstar suspended some scheduled 
international flights (Cirium, 2020d). For the Qantas Group, the grounding of around 150 aircraft reduced 
its international capacity by around 90% and domestic by 60% (Cirium, 2020d). 
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 Quadrant III: Internally generated long-term responses 
Quadrant III focuses on strategic and operational activities developed and employed by firms to respond 
to and prepare for the post-crisis period and recovery of services. In the past, most firms were assumed to 
be passive recipients of events in their external environment. However, it was observed that in the face of 
a partial or full lockdown in most nations, airlines engaged in corporate political activities where they 
engage with policymakers to enact the “rule of the game”. Our analysis indicates that at the same time, 
many sought to lobby governments for aid packages to help them overcome the sharp decline in demand. 
Following the cessation of flights and governments’ restrictions on flights, many airlines starting burning 
through cash reserves, further diminishing their financial positions and making failure more likely 
(Cirium, 2020f). Accordingly, some airlines such as Virgin Australia and Air New Zealand sought 
government financial support to help them overcome their predicament (Cirium, 2020f). As the industry 
group, the IATA made calls for support and cautioned of dire consequences facing the industry with global 
revenues from ticket sales falling as much as £215bn (BBC, 2020a, 2020b). To offset the negative effects 
of these dramatic changes culminating in loss of revenue, some airlines pursued cost-reductions via 
offloading workers, terminating affected routes and encouraging some employees to work from home. 
The state-owned, and one of the world’s biggest long-haul airlines, Emirates, adopted measures such as a 
temporary 25% to 50% basic salary reduction for employees to help them keep highly skilled employees 
as well as minimise or avoid job losses (Cornwell, 2020; Klar, 2020). This was also designed to enable it 
to mobilise employees and resources swiftly to resume services for customers when conditions improve 
and the outbreak is controlled (Cornwell, 2020; Klar, 2020).  
 Quadrant IV: Externally imposed long-term responses 
Quadrant IV demonstrates the wider and long-term effects of the imposition of action on firms and living 
through this post-COVID environment. Here, measures such as in-flight social distancing policies, 
government-mandated air travel restrictions and other externally imposed measures are key. Long-term 
consequences are predicated on the effects of short-term imposed directives and measures on the industry. 
In this direction, the International Air Transport Association in collaboration with the World Health 
Organization have developed guidelines to guide cabin crew and airport workers, e.g. captains are required 
to inform air traffic control of suspected communicable disease (IATA, 2020b). Indeed, the IATA 
represents around 290 airlines, accounting for 82% of overall air traffic, and develops industry-wide 
policies on pivotal issues. Figure 3 presents graphically the changes and shift from pre-COVID to post-
COVID environment and firms’ recovery strategy.  
11 
Figure 3: Phases of Changing Environment 
 
4 Conclusion  
In this research note, we set out to examine how airlines’ have responded to COVID-19 and factors that 
facilitate, shape or constrain their responses. A unified conceptual framework was developed to capture 
the internally generated and externally imposed strategic and tactical responses over both the short and 
long terms. The study highlighted the host of factors that impinged on and shaped airlines’ decisions and 
responses to respond to the threat such as government-mandated actions in terms of travel restrictions, 
quarantines and social-distancing schemes. The government-mandated and other external constraints 
curtailed firms’ strategic investment and route network decisions, thereby altering the competitive 
positions of many airlines and further weakening already weak airlines and financially healthy ones. One 
notable innovation was the introduction in-flight social distancing into the airline business model with 
long-term implications in terms of in-flight arrangements, high-density seating and in-flight services. 
Taken together, in responding to the crisis, airlines sought to minimise the erosion of long-developed 
market capabilities, route networks, and prior relationship of trust with customers. From a practical 
standpoint, the analysis underlines the need for the aviation industry and governments to ensure that the 
new in-flight social distancing policies do not translate into expensive procedures that make quality in-
flight arrangements and high-density seating difficult to achieve.  
 Limitations and directions for future research discussions 
In interpreting the present study, one must bear in mind some notable limitations. First, it is worth pointing 
out that the crisis is ongoing and therefore the analysis only represents a snapshot of the current state of 
affairs and firms’ actions. Thus, future studies could systematically examine the post-crisis and recovery 
strategies adopted by airlines. Second, the 2 × 2 matrix offers opportunity for future research to examine 
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the effects of different approaches among different types of airlines such as traditional legacy airlines and 
low-cost carriers. Future studies could also examine the effects of in-flight social distancing on the 
traditional hub-and-spoke and point-to-point networks, in-flight catering services, fleet utilisation and seat 
allocation. This is important given that in-flight social distancing has potential of curtailing high-density 
seating that typify short-haul services and some long-haul services. To stimulate a much deeper 
understanding of the effects of COVID-19 on businesses, future studies could pursue these fruitful 
avenues.  
Acknowledgments 
The author is very grateful to Transportation Research Part E - Editor Professor Choi and the five 
anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments, which have helped enormously to elevate the 
arguments and analysis. Much appreciated. 
 
References 
Aguinis, H., & Bakker, R. M. (2020). Time is of the essence: Improving the conceptualization and 
measurement of time. Human Resource Management Review, 100763. 
Amankwah-Amoah, J. (2015). Governments, airlines and employees: an evolving relationship from 1940 
to 2010. Management & Organizational History, 10(1), 1-20. 
Amankwah-Amoah, J. (2015b). Solar energy in sub-Saharan Africa: The challenges and opportunities of 
technological leapfrogging. Thunderbird International Business Review, 57(1), 15–31. 
Amankwah‐Amoah, J. (2016a). Ebola and global airline business: An integrated framework of companies’ 
responses to adverse environmental shock. Thunderbird International Business Review, 58(5), 
385-397. 
Amankwah-Amoah, J. (2016b). An integrative process model of organisational failure. Journal of 
Business Research, 69(9), 3388-3397. 
Amankwah-Amoah, J. (2020). Stepping up and stepping out of COVID-19: New challenges for 
environmental sustainability policies in the global airline industry. Journal of Cleaner Production, 
271,123000. 
Amankwah-Amoah, J. Khan, Z., & Wood, G. (2020). COVID-19 and Business Failures: The Paradoxes 
of Experience, Scale and Scope for Theory and Practice. European Management Journal. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.emj.2020.09.002. 
Amankwah-Amoah, J., & Debrah, Y.A. (2010). The protracted collapse of Ghana Airways: Lessons in 
organizational failure. Group & Organization Management, 35(5), 636-665. 
Amankwah‐Amoah, J., & Debrah, Y.A. (2011). The evolution of alliances in the global airline industry: 
A review of the African experience. Thunderbird International Business Review, 53(1), 37-50. 
Amankwah‐Amoah, J., Antwi‐Agyei, I., & Zhang, H. (2018). Integrating the dark side of competition into 
explanations of business failures: Evidence from a developing economy. European Management 
Review, 15(1), 97-109. 
BBC (2020a). Coronavirus: More flights cancelled by Virgin, Ryanair and others. Retrieved 02.04.2020, 
from: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-51904769. 
BBC (2020b). Coronavirus: No extra help for airlines, chancellor says. Retrieved 02.04.2020, from: 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-52027342. 
BBC (2020c). Coronavirus: American Airlines to seek $12bn in state aid. Retrieved 02.04.2020, from: 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-52101665. 
BBC (2020d). Coronavirus: China reports no Covid-19 deaths for first time. Retrieved 08.04.2020, from: 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-52195034. 
13 
Bluedorn, A.C., & Ferris, S.P., 2004. Temporal depth, age, and organizational performance. In Epstein, 
C. F., Kalleberg, A.L. (Eds.), Fighting for Time. Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 113-149. 
Bluedorn, A.C., Martin, G. 2008. The time frames of entrepreneurs. Journal of Business Venturing 23(1), 
1-20. 
Bruton, G.D., Ahlstrom, D., & Wan, J.C.C. (2003). Turnaround in East Asian firms: Evidence from ethnic 
Overseas Chinese communities. Strategic Management Journal, 24(6), 519–540. 
Bryson, J. M. (1981). A perspective on planning and crises in the public sector. Strategic Management 
Journal, 2(2), 181–196. 
Cai, Y. J., & Choi, T. M. (2020). A United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals perspective for 
sustainable textile and apparel supply chain management. Transportation Research Part E: 
Logistics and Transportation Review, 141, 102010. 
Chaudhary, V., & Maidment, J. (2020). Why are Britain’s borders STILL open? Retrieved 02.04.2020, 
from: https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-8143347/Passenger-fury-Heathrow-Airport-
fails-insist-social-distancing-border-control-queues.html. 
Choi, T. M. (2020). Innovative “bring-service-near-your-home” operations under Corona-virus (COVID-
19/SARS-CoV-2) outbreak: Can logistics become the messiah?. Transportation Research Part E: 
Logistics and Transportation Review, 140, 101961. 
Chua, A. (2020a). Australia rolls out aid package for aviation industry. Retrieved 02.04.2020, from: 
https://www.flightglobal.com/air-transport/australia-rolls-out-aid-package-for-aviation-
industry/137357.article. 
Chua, A. (2020b). Virgin Australia cuts entire international network, halves domestic capacity. Retrieved 
02.04.2020, from: https://www.flightglobal.com/airlines/virgin-australia-cuts-entire-
international-network-halves-domestic-capacity/137356.article. 
Chua, A. (2020c). Singapore Airlines and SilkAir reduce capacity to China over. Retrieved 02.04.2020, 
from: https://www.flightglobal.com/strategy/sia-group-slashes-capacity-to-china-over-
coronavirus-outbreak/136466.article. 
Cirium (2020a). Air Malta to suspend all flights as government imposes travel ban. Retrieved 02.04.2020, 
from: https://www.flightglobal.com/strategy/air-malta-to-suspend-all-flights-as-government-
imposes-travel-ban/137369.article. 
Cirium (2020b). South African Airways suspends all international services. Retrieved 02.04.2020, from: 
https://www.flightglobal.com/networks/south-african-airways-suspends-all-international-
services/137440.article. 
Cirium (2020d). Qantas and Jetstar suspend all international flights. Retrieved 02.04.2020, from: 
https://www.flightglobal.com/airlines/qantas-and-jetstar-suspend-all-international-
flights/137391.article. 
Cirium (2020e). Air Canada suspends Beijing and Shanghai amid coronavirus. Retrieved 02.04.2020, 
from: https://www.flightglobal.com/airlines/air-canada-suspends-beijing-and-shanghai-amid-
coronavirus/136441.article. 
Cirium (2020f). Virgin Australia seeks $865m financial support from government. Retrieved 02.04.2020, 
from: https://www.flightglobal.com/airlines/virgin-australia-seeks-865m-financial-support-from-
government/137634.article. 
Cornwell, A. (2020). Emirates to Suspend All Passenger Operations Starting March 25. Retrieved 
02.04.2020, from: https://www.huffpost.com/entry/emirates-to-suspend-passenger-
operations_l_5e777bc8c5b63c3b64924504. 
Craighead, C. W., Ketchen Jr, D. J., & Darby, J. L. (2020). Pandemics and Supply Chain Management 
Research: Toward a Theoretical Toolbox. Decision Sciences. 51(4), 838-866. 
de Figueiredo, R.J.P., Feldman, E.R., & Rawley, E. (2019). The costs of refocusing: Evidence from hedge 
fund closures during the financial crisis. Strategic Management Journal, 40(8), 1268–1290. 
Delmas, M. A., & Toffel, M. W. (2008). Organizational responses to environmental demands: Opening 
the black box. Strategic Management Journal, 29(10), 1027-1055. 
14 
Doganis, R. 2006. The Airline Business. 2nd edition. London: Routledge. 
Dunn, G. (2020a). Which European carriers are suspending all flights because of coronavirus - updated 
20 March. Retrieved 02.04.2020, from: https://www.flightglobal.com/airlines/which-european-
carriers-are-suspending-all-flights-because-of-coronavirus/137376.article. 
Dunn, G. (2020b). Europe’s carriers lurch into full crisis-mode as capacity slashed. Retrieved 02.04.2020, 
from: https://www.flightglobal.com/airlines/europes-carriers-lurch-into-full-crisis-mode-as-
capacity-slashed/137295.article 
Dunn, G. (2020c). Airlines cut back China flights as WHO declares coronavirus a global emergency. 
Retrieved 02.04.2020, from: https://www.flightglobal.com/airlines/airlines-cut-back-china-
flights-as-who-declares-coronavirus-a-global-emergency/136458.article 
Dunn, G. (2020d). Tracking how European airlines have cut capacity during crisis. Retrieved 02.04.2020, 
from: https://www.flightglobal.com/airlines/tracking-how-european-airlines-have-cut-capacity-
during-crisis/137521.article.  
European Commission (2020). Mobility and Transport. Retrieved 02.04.2020, from: 
https://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/25years-eu-aviation_en. 
Flight International (2020). Bidding goodbye to BA’s ‘Queen of the Skies’. Retrieved 1.08.2020, from:  
https://www.flightglobal.com/flight-international-opinion/bidding-goodbye-to-bas-queen-of-the-
skies/139481.article. 
Frost, L. (2020). European airlines resist mounting coronavirus refund claims. Retrieved 02.04.2020, 
from: https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-airlines-refunds/european-airlines-
resist-mounting-coronavirus-refund-claims-idUKKBN21E2ZM 
FT (2020). Five ways companies can get UK government help to deal with coronavirus. Retrieved 
02.04.2020, from: https://www.ft.com/content/ff00ec96-6481-11ea-b3f3-fe4680ea68b5. 
Govindan, K., Mina, H., & Alavi, B. (2020). A decision support system for demand management in 
healthcare supply chains considering the epidemic outbreaks: A case study of coronavirus disease 
2019 (COVID-19). Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 
101967. 
Grzymala-Busse, A. (2011). Time will tell? Temporality and the analysis of causal mechanisms and 
processes. Comparative Political Studies, 44(9), 1267-1297. 
Harper, J. (2020). Airlines warn they may not survive without bailout. Retrieved 02.04.2020, from: 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-51943289. 
Hester, E. (2020). Coronavirus means social distancing. For flight attendants, it’s suddenly easier. 
Retrieved 02.04.2020, from: https://www.latimes.com/travel/story/2020-03-25/travel-social-
distancing-airplanes 
Hsu, T., and Flitter, M. (2020). Businesses Face a New Coronavirus Threat: Shrinking Access to Credit. 
Retrieved 17.034.2020, from: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/15/technology/microsoft-
coronavirus-response.html 
IATA (2019). The Value Of Air Transport In Brasil. IATA. 
IATA (2020a). IATA Thanks Brazilian Government for Supporting Aviation Industry in Face of COVID-
19. Retrieved 02.04.2020, from: https://www.iata.org/en/pressroom/pr/2020-03-20-01/. 
IATA (2020b). Suspected Communicable Disease Guidelines for cabin crew. Retrieved 02.04.2020, from: 
https://www.iata.org/contentassets/f1163430bba94512a583eb6d6b24aa56/health-guidelines-
cabin-crew.pdf 
Indiatoday (2020). Coronavirus: DGCA asks airlines to keep middle seat on flights empty, use sanitisers, 
practice social distancing. Retrieved 02.04.2020, from: 
https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/coronavirus-dgca-asks-airlines-to-keep-middle-seat-on-
flights-empty-use-sanitisers-practice-social-distancing-1658697-2020-03-23. 
Ivanov, D. (2020). Predicting the impacts of epidemic outbreaks on global supply chains: A simulation-
based analysis on the coronavirus outbreak (COVID-19/SARS-CoV-2) case. Transportation 
Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 136, 101922. 
15 
Janzen, J. (2020). Airlines Disappointed with European Commission Guidelines on EU261. Retrieved 
02.04.2020, from: https://a4e.eu/publications/airlines-disappointed-with-european-commission-
guidelines-on-eu261/ March 27, 2020. 
Johnson, L.M. (2020). If you must fly, here are some tips to do it safely. Retrieved 08.04.2020, from: 
https://edition.cnn.com/travel/article/airlines-social-distancing-policies-during-coronavirus-
trnd/index.html 
Kaminski-Morrow, D. (2020a). British Airways suspends mainland Chinese services. Retrieved 
02.04.2020, from: https://www.flightglobal.com/networks/british-airways-suspends-mainland-
chinese-services/136420.article. 
Kaminski-Morrow, D. (2020b). Lufthansa carriers suspend mainland China services. Retrieved 
02.04.2020, from: https://www.flightglobal.com/safety/lufthansa-carriers-suspend-mainland-
china-services/136435.article 
Klar, R. (2020). Emirates cuts almost all passenger flights. Retrieved 02.04.2020, from: 
https://thehill.com/policy/transportation/488902-emirates-cuts-almost-all-passenger-flights 22-3-
20. 
Lee, D. (2020). Coronavirus: Social distancing takes flight as airlines in Asia-Pacific experiment with 
putting space between passengers. Retrieved 02.04.2020, from: 
https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/hong-kong-economy/article/3076286/coronavirus-
social-distancing-takes-flight. 
Lieberman, M. B., & Montgomery, D.B. (1988). First‐mover advantages. Strategic management journal, 
9(S1), 41-58. 
Lieberman, M.B., & Montgomery, D.B. (1998). First‐mover (dis) advantages: retrospective and link with 
the resource‐based view. Strategic management journal, 19(12), 1111-1125. 
Lipsitch, M., Swerdlow, D. L., & Finelli, L. (2020). Defining the epidemiology of Covid-19—studies 
needed. New England Journal of Medicine. 382:1194-1196. 
Loske, D. (2020). The impact of COVID-19 on transport volume and freight capacity dynamics: An 
empirical analysis in German food retail logistics. Transportation Research Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives, 6, 100165. 
Makadok, R. (1998). Can first‐mover and early‐mover advantages be sustained in an industry with low 
barriers to entry/imitation?. Strategic Management Journal, 19(7), 683-696. 
McCutchen Jr, W.W. (1993). Strategy changes as a response to alterations in tax policy. Journal of 
Management, 19(3), 575-593. 
Mellahi, K. and Wilkinson, A. (2004). Organizational failure: A critique of recent research and a proposed 
integrative framework. International Journal of Management Reviews, 5(1), 21–41. 
Meyer, A.D. (1982). Adapting to environmental jolts. Administrative Science Quarterly, 27, 515–537. 
Mishra, A. K. (1996) Organizational responses to crisis: The centrality of trust. In R. Kramer & T. Tyler 
(Eds.) Trust in Organizations: Frontiers of Theory and Research, 261-287. Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage. 
NATS (2020). Weathering the storm: Coronavirus and air traffic control. Retrieved 02.04.2020, from: 
https://nats.aero/blog/2020/03/weathering-the-storm-coronavirus-and-air-traffic-control/. 
Nigmatulina, K. R., & Larson, R. C. (2009). Living with influenza: Impacts of government imposed and 
voluntarily selected interventions. European Journal of Operational Research, 195(2), 613-627. 
Perrow, C. (1970). Organizational Analysis: A Sociological View. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. 
Puhak, J. (2020). Major US airlines continue slashing service during coronavirus outbreak: 'We will get 
through this'. Retrieved 02.04.2020, from: https://www.foxnews.com/travel/coronavirus-major-
airlines-us-service-slash 
Salaudeen, A. (2020). African airlines lose $4.4 billion in revenue following the spread of coronavirus on 
the continent. Retrieved 02.04.2020, from: https://edition.cnn.com/2020/03/19/africa/coronavirus-
africa-airlines/index.html. March 28, 2020. 
16 
Specia, M. (2020). British Airways pulls 747s from fleet, ending an era. New York Times, July 18, Sect. 
A, 11. 
The Canadian Transportation Agency (CTA) (2020). Statement on Vouchers. Retrieved 02.04.2020, from: 
https://otc-cta.gc.ca/eng/statement-vouchers. 
The Economist (2020a). Apocalypse soon. 434(9184), 24. 
The Economist (2020b). Where will it be worst? 434(9185), 55. 
The Economist (2020c). A deadly disease disrupts. 434(9181), 51-52. 
The Economist (2020d). Airlines running out of cash. Retrieved 02.04.2020, from: 
https://www.economist.com/business/2020/03/19/airlines-are-running-out-of-cash. 
Waldron, G. (2020). Coronavirus outbreak follows years of strong airline traffic growth at Wuhan airport. 
Retrieved 02.04.2020, from: https://www.flightglobal.com/air-transport/coronavirus-outbreak-
follows-years-of-strong-airline-traffic-growth-at-wuhan-airport/136273.article 
Walsh, P. (2020). Twin Cities-based Compass Airlines points to coronavirus as factor in shutting down. 
Retrieved 02.06.2020, from: http://www.startribune.com/twin-cities-based-compass-airlines-
points-to-coronavirus-as-factor-in-shutting-down/568939812/?refresh=true. Retrieved 21 March 
2020. 
Wenzel, M., Stanske, S., & Lieberman, M.B. (2020). Strategic responses to crisis. Strategic Management 
Journal, 41: V7–V18.  
Whetten, D.A. (1987). Organization growth and decline processes. Annual Review of Sociology, 13, 335–
358. 
Wolfsteller, P. (2020a). American suspends all flights to China. Retrieved 02.04.2020, from: 
https://www.flightglobal.com/airlines/american-suspends-all-flights-to-china/136478.article 
Wolfsteller, P. (2020b). Trans States Airlines to fold in April. Retrieved 02.04.2020, from: 
https://www.flightglobal.com/strategy/trans-states-airlines-to-fold-in-april/137349.article 
World Health Organization (2020a). Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19): Situation report - 65. 
Geneva: WHO. 
World Health Organization (2020b). Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) Situation Report – 197. Geneva: 
WHO. 
World Health Organization (2020c). Operational considerations for managing COVID-19 cases or 
outbreak in aviation. Retrieved 02.04.2020, from: 
https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/331488/WHO-2019-nCoV-Aviation-2020.1-
eng.pdf. 
Worldometers (2020). Coronavirus Cases. Retrieved 14.09.2020, from: 
https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/. 
Yu, H., Sun, X., Solvang, W.D., & Zhao, X. (2020). Reverse logistics network design for effective 
management of medical waste in epidemic outbreaks: Insights from the coronavirus disease 2019 
(COVID-19) outbreak in Wuhan (China). International Journal of Environmental Research and 
Public Health, 17(5), 1770. 
Zhang, H., Amankwah-Amoah, J., & Beaverstock, J. (2019). Toward a construct of dynamic capabilities 




ONLINE SUPPLEMENTARY APPENDICES 
 
 
Online Supplementary Appendix 1: The Global Airline Industry and COVID-19  
 
A useful way to view the global airline industry is through the waves of deregulations and liberalisations ushered in by governments around the globe, 
underpinned by the notions of limited government and limited intervention in industries and businesses (Amankwah-Amoah, 2015; Amankwah‐Amoah 
& Debrah, 2010, 2011; Doganis, 2006). Despite the progress, the industry has faced many challenges including the severe acute respiratory syndrome 
(SARS) outbreak, the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, the September 11 attacks and the Ebola outbreak in West Africa. In the past couple of years, there 
has been a view that global airlines have successfully circumvented the negative effects of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. However, between late 
2019 and early 2020 the coronavirus outbreak emerged and spread from Wuhan, China to countries around the world. When the World Health Organization 
(WHO) noted Europe as being one of the epicentres of the COVID-19 pandemic in mid-March 2020, air travel was already under severe government 
restrictions (Dunn, 2020b). Firms in industries such as airlines, travel and retail that depend on consumer discretionary spending for success and even 
survival were heavily affected, with wider effects on the national economies (Hsu & Flitter, 2020). When China emerged as an integral player in the global 
economy, many of its cities also became more connected to the rest of the world. This was further exemplified by the fact that Cirium’s data on schedules 
indicate that airlines offered 332,861 departing seats from Wuhan in January 2020, a twofold surge over the numbers for January 2010 and threefold from 
January 2003 during the SARS outbreak (Waldron, 2020).  
Besides banning or curtailing large-scale people gatherings, the virus preventative measures curtailed or halted service-oriented businesses such as airlines 
and restaurants. There was a concern that many airlines would unknowingly carry infected passengers, thereby facilitating the global spread of the virus. 
Governments around the globe issued guidelines against not only travel to non-essential China but also international travel. As countries issued national 
stay-at-home orders and mandated the closure of most business premises, it became a public healthcare and strategic necessity for airlines to halt most of 
their operations. The wider impact surpassed the effects on the industry by the September 11 attacks. The International Air Transport Association (IATA) 
noted that worldwide revenues from ticket sales for the industry could decline by as much as $252bn (around a 44% decline compared with 2019) if the 
restrictions and travel bans persist for just three months (BBC, 2020b).  
According to the IATA (2020a), the COVID-19 outbreak is expected to cost the aviation industry US$113 billion. Growing consumer, government and 
public concerns over COVID-19 prompted businesses to pursue a range of strategies geared towards maintaining their operations whilst addressing social 
concerns. For instance, by late March 2020, air traffic volumes in the UK had dropped 77% (a shift from 6,224 flights in March 2019 to 1,415 flights by 
25 March 2020), 80% in Germany, 82% in France, 85% in Spain and 88% in Italy, with the few limited flights providing essential services such as medical 
supplies and equipment/goods delivery (NATS, 2020). These figures exemplify the severe impact of COVID-19 on air transport which are manifested in 
terms of the number of cancellations of booked trips and governments imposing travel bans, which culminated in around $113bn in lost sales noted by 
the IATA (The Economist, 2020d). The speed of change and all-encompassing nature of the effects have prompted a quest for a better understanding of 
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To further illustrate this quadrant, in March 2020, Air New Zealand proposed making empty seats 
between passengers obligatory (an element of its in-flight social distancing) as a means of helping to 
minimise transmission of the virus (Lee, 2020). This was intended as a confidence-building measure on 
the part of the airlines to protect their customers. Some airlines in the Asia-Pacific region took the lead 
with Air New Zealand in forcing some passengers to sit apart, and Cathay Pacific Airways and Virgin 
Australia also offered passengers the option of sitting next to an empty seat (Lee, 2020). Some airlines 
including American Airlines and United Airlines sought to implement some social distancing by not 
seating customers in middle seats where possible as well as allowing some seat changes upon request 
(Johnson, 2020; Amankwah-Amoah, 2020). Cam Wallace (https://twitter.com/CamWallace_NZ), Air 
New Zealand’s chief revenue officer noted on their measures: 
“Our commercial team are implementing protocols to ensure appropriate distancing on flights 
… The team are working on amending seat maps and implementing restrictions on sales for 
flights to allow distancing. This will remove significant seat capacity especially on regional 
services … The commercial team have implemented the distancing seating maps for domestic 
jet and regional services!”. 
Most major airlines sought to implement elements of social distancing by also limiting in-flight 
refreshments to minimise contact between employees and customers ((Johnson, 2020; Amankwah-
Amoah, 2020). Some also encouraged customers to bring their own beverages and food. For carriers 
such as Delta Air Lines, the beverages on some flights were limited to bottled water depending on the 
journey length (Johnson, 2020). Similarly, the dual effects of the crisis were further demonstrated when 
other airlines such as Alaska Airlines offered the option of being able to cancel or reschedule a flight if 
your seat was not within a good social distance from other passengers. With regard to temperature 
checks, major Korean carriers and Taiwan’s China Airlines and Eva Air indicated that travellers’ 
forehead temperature would be taken and those with over 37.5 degrees Celsius or travellers objecting 
to being checked would be refused boarding, and during flights passengers had to wear masks other 
than when eating or drinking (Lee, 2020). The in-flight social distancing and other measures were 
internally designed but also influenced by the external forces to help airlines fortify their business or 
reduce the depletion of financial resources. It must be noted that the intent of governments financial 
support is often to provide stability and minimising the financial strains faced by the airlines. 
Termination and suspension of services 
Among the possible strategic options to address the crisis, most of the world’s airlines opted to 
temporarily halt flights as the virus transmission unfolded due to the dwindling number of passengers 
and governments imposed border controls and restrictions (Dunn, 2020). In January 2020, Singapore 
Airlines announced a reduction in flights to cities such as Beijing and Shanghai Pudong, and SilkAir to 
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in the country (Chua, 2020c). SIA’s low-cost affiliate, Scoot, also suspended flights to China due to the 
weak market demand for air travel and the operational constraints imposed on airline businesses (Chua, 
2020c). These approaches were not in isolation from the trend in the industry but simply mimicked what 
many airlines in the region and beyond adopted. Echoing this move, in January 2020, Air Canada 
announced the decision to suspend all direct flights to Shanghai and Beijing as the Canadian government 
issued guidelines against non-essential travel to mainland China (Cirium, 2020e). In a similar vein, in 
January 2020, Lufthansa Group also halted services to Shenyang, Nanjing, Beijing and Shanghai, and 
BA suspended flights to mainland China (Kaminski-Morrow, 2020b). When WHO declared the 
outbreak a Public Health Emergency (Chua, 2020c), other airlines followed suit, including Vietnam’s 
VietJet, Air Astana, Air New Zealand (Auckland-Shanghai routes) and Indonesia’s Lion Air Group,  
In January 2020, British Airways suspended services to mainland China following the UK 
government’s Foreign Office mandate against all but essential travel to the country (Kaminski-Morrow, 
2020a). Similarly, Virgin Australia temporarily reduced domestic capacity by around 50% and reduced 
international flights, all attributed to the travel restrictions stemming from the virus leading to reduced 
demand for air travel (Chua, 2020b). The waves of suspensions/cancellations continued in the 
subsequent months from January and extended beyond just inter-China routes to within 
regions/continental routes in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and beyond.  
Some airlines such as Air Malta halted operations in line with the Maltese government’s directive to 
end commercial air travel but the airline also sought to operate some services for humanitarian purposes 
(Cirium, 2020a). By early April 2020, 80% of flights across Europe were grounded (Dunn, 2020d). The 
magnitude of flights cancellations was further exemplified by the fact that the largest airlines in Europe 
(Air France-KLM, EasyJet, Lufthansa, IAG and Ryanair) were operating at around 90% reduced 
capacity (Dunn, 2020d). In the UK, for instance, airlines such as Virgin Atlantic and BA-owner IAG 
reduced capacity by 75% whilst elsewhere Norwegian Air and many other airlines cancelled numerous 
flights (BBC, 2020a, 2020b). Following WHO’s declaration of COVID-19 as an international public 
health emergency, airlines across the globe suspended some services (Dunn, 2020c). Suspension of 
cancellations “rules” 
Although Canada allowed airlines to give travel vouchers rather than cash refunds for abandoned flights 
(The Canadian Transportation Agency, 2020), this prompted a call for the European Commission and 
UK governments to adopt a similar approach. Our review suggests that some cash-strapped European 
airlines lobbied to try to defer European Union rules that require airlines to provide a refund for 
cancellations within a week. They rather sought to issue vouchers to clients who were left out of pocket 
(Frost, 2020). Given some airlines were already flouting the refund rules, this was seen as an attempt 
by airlines to secure “interest-free loans” by keeping customers’ cash (Frost, 2020). Although the 
European Commission rejected the call to loosen the requirements, some airline lobby groups such as 
Airlines for Europe (A4E) with airline members including EasyJet, Air France–KLM, Lufthansa and 
Ryanair, argued that they simply were not in a position to comply given their cashflow problems 
(Janzen, 2020). It is worth noting here that these “rules” are limited in scope in a sense that they can 







To further elucidate this quadrant, governments have proposed as means of helping airlines to overcome 
such challenges associated with forced cancellations of international flights (Harper, 2020). For 
instance, the Brazilian Civil Aviation Authority (ANAC) also temporarily waived the minimum 80% 
slot usage rule for firms, which helped to improve airlines’ survival chances and help such emerging 
economies maintain a higher degree of air flight connectivity which is essential for development and 
recovery in the post-crisis period (IATA, 2020a). These were important steps given that aviation 
accounts for US$18.8 billion of its GDP, supports around 839,000 jobs and offers numerous city-pair 
connections (IATA, 2019). For instance, the Brazilian government adopted measures such as deferring 
payment of air navigation and airport concession fees by airlines and offered special credit lines to 
buttress airlines’ financial positions (IATA, 2020a).  
In Australia, the government launched a $430 million relief package for the industry including fee 
waivers on aviation fuel excise and regional aviation security charges (Chua, 2020a). When the World 
Health Organization declaration emerged, the Allied Pilots Association (APA), acting on behalf of 
American Airlines’ pilots, filed a lawsuit seeking cessation of flights to mainland China (Wolfsteller, 
2020a, p. nd). In late January 2020, American Airlines suspended flights to China in light of the 
outbreak as the airlines’ pilots also sued to halt services to China (Wolfsteller, 2020a, p. nd). Some 
airlines have adopted emergency measures to halt operations to reduce costs.  
Exit 
Another visible manifestation of the effects was that the crisis not only pushed vulnerable airlines 
towards bankruptcy but also airlines which were in a financially stable and healthy position before the 
crisis (Harper, 2020). In order to protect themselves in the wake of COVID-19, some airlines 
consciously opted to focus on averting bankruptcy in the short-term, but it was inevitable for some. One 
of the unintended outcomes was that coronavirus spread at such a rapid rate that it shifted a largely 
profitable industry from profitability into a negative territory (Walsh, 2020). No international airline 
was immune from the devastating effects of coronavirus’s effect. Given that many airlines have 
borrowed heavily to acquire or lease planes which were grounded by COVID-19, the global industry 
needed around $200bn in state aid for many airlines to maintain operation (The Economist, 2020d).  
By January 2020, the standard airline had cash to cover just “between 50% and 80% of short-term 
liabilities and about two months of revenues … and three-quarters could not cover costs beyond three 
months” (The Economist, 2020d, p. nd). These situations left many airlines in a precarious situation of 
having to embrace cutting flights to many domestic and international destinations, and offloading 
workers.  
As industries such as tourism see a decline in the number of tourists (The Economist, 2020c), airlines 
have also witnessed a dramatic decline in the number of bookings and a surge in cancellations. This has 
further amplified by the good number of financially weak firms prior to the crisis. Subsequently, the 
outbreak brought some airlines to the brink of bankruptcy and even closure including Compass Airlines, 
US (Walsh, 2020). The flight restrictions and collapse in demand following the coronavirus outbreak 
further amplified the problems of UK-based struggling carrier Flybe, culminating in its collapse and 
Government-
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closure in March 2020 (Salaudeen, 2020). The decimation of the industry by the COVID-19 pandemic 
was further exemplified when Trans States Airlines collapsed (Wolfsteller, 2020b). The airline which 
serviced around 200 daily flights to 80 cities in North America was also affected by pilot shortage and 
consolidation in the industry (Wolfsteller, 2020b). Besides these, the pandemic also affected surviving 






To further explicate this quadrant, amid the global coronavirus outbreak and cancellations of passenger 
flights, some airlines such as Emirates maintained some important international cargo flight service 
with a focus on the future (Klar, 2020).Take the case of Qantas which cancelled many international 
flights and sent home most of its 30,000 employees to be able to recover quickly in the long term 
(Harper, 2020). In a similar vein, by late March 2020, Ryanair had reduced its capacity by 80%, Air 
France-KLM between 70% and 90%, Lufthansa Group was operating at just 5% of its total capacity 
and parking around 700 of its 763 aircraft (Dunn, 2020d). In a similar vein, Turkish Airlines also 
suspended all its international flights with the notable exception of five route services to New York, 
Moscow, Hong Kong, Washington and Addis Ababa (Dunn, 2020d). Most of the firms sought to 
maintain their expertise and resources with a focus on the future.  
 




cancellation of orders.  














To further illuminate this quadrant, government-mandated social distancing measures are likely to 
impact airlines’ seating arrangements and route connections in the long term. It is safe to say that the 
WHO Guide to Hygiene and Sanitation in Aviation should be further strengthened as pandemics are 
becoming a common occurrence. Given that many short-term responses were induced through 
government actions, directives and mandates, long-term survival chances would be rooted in 
organisations that are able to quickly mobilise and deliver quality services in the immediate post-crisis 
phase. The lifeblood of successful organisations in the post-crisis environment is likely to be innovation 
that delivers customers an assurance of safety and quality services, and addresses their social distancing 
concerns. The initial crisis response centred on minor operations measures whilst late responses were 
more strategic in their focus. Given that ticketed passengers unable to board their designated flights 
could pay a penalty and get on different flight, the revenue from the original booking become difficult 
to account for as having been obtained. This pandemic has triggered waves of governments across the 
globe issuing different guidance to their citizens against all non-essential travels forcing many ticketed 
passengers to cancel their flights leading to depleting of financial resources of airlines. 
 
Wider adoption of in-
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loans and support.  
• Major American airlines, Virgin Australia and Air New Zealand all sought government financial 
support. 
 
Corporate level- scaling 
back. 
• Qantas Group deferred previously declared $112 million dividend pay-out and terminate its share 
repurchase initiative (Cirium, 2020d). 
Initial suspension of flights 
to routes to China. 
• Some European and other airlines that announced flight suspensions in response to Covid-19 
include LOT Polish, Poland; Czech Airlines, Czech Republic; SAS, Sweden; Air Baltic, Latvia; 
Lauda, Austria; TUI Airlines UK; Air Moldova, Moldova; La Compagnie, France; Air Dolomiti, 
Italy; Austrian Airlines, Austria; Volotea, Spain; Air Malta, Malta; Brussels Airlines, Belgium; 
Transavia France, France; Transavia Airlines, Netherlands; Jet2, UK, Luxair Luxembourg; Ryanair, 
Ireland. From Africa, airlines such as Rwanda Air and Air Mauritius also suspended services to 
China (Salaudeen, 2020)  
• Iberia, Air Canada; British Airways, Lufthansa, Qantas, Aer Lingus, Singapore Airlines; SilkAir; 
Scootetc.  
• In March 2020, South African Airways also cancel international services but maintained services on 





bankruptcy as demand for 
services collapse. 
• South Africa Airways (SAA) sought bankruptcy protection (Salaudeen, 2020). 
• Collapsed of Trans States Airlines (Wolfsteller, 2020b), Flybe in March 2020 (Salaudeen, 2020) 
and Compass Airlines, US (Walsh, 2020) all attributed to the pandemic. 
Initially reduced services 
attributed to government-
mandated travel restrictions 
and decreased consumer 
demand. 
• Airlines citing these factors included British Airways, Delta Air Lines, KLM, Qantas, American 







Cancellation and temporary 
layoff including cabin crew, 
pilots, administrators, 
maintenance employees. 
• In March 2020, British Airways proposed to suspend 80% of ground handling staff, cabin crew, 
engineers and employees at its head office. 
• Norwegian Air (around lay off 7,000 staff); Scandinavian airline SAS (lay off around 90% of 
workforce); American Airlines offered employees option for voluntary leave and early retirement. 
Data sources: synthesised by the authors from: Puhak, 2020; Harper, 2020; BBC, 2020a, 2020b, c; Puhak, 2020; Dunn, 2020a; Kaminski-
Morrow, 2020b; Cirium, 2020a-d; Salaudeen, 2020. 
